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Többpartneres párosítási játék 
 
Biró Péter - Walter Kern - Daniël Paulusma – Wojuteczky Péter 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Két ismert játékelméleti modell általánosítását, a többpartneres párosítási játékot vizsgáljuk, 
amely egy G=(N,E) gráfon, b kapacitásfüggvénnyel és w élsúlyokkal van megadva. Az N 
halmaz tartalmazza a játékosokat, amelyek egy M⊆E élhalmazt alkotnak, mely kételemű ij 
párokból áll w(ij) súllyal úgy, hogy minden i játékos legfeljebb b(i) párban szerepel. A 
kifizetés egy p:N×N→R függvény, amelyre p(i,j)+p(j,i)=w(ij) teljesül minden ij∈M esetén és 
p(i,j)=p(j,i)=0 ha ij∉M. Az (M,p) párt a játék egy megoldásának nevezzük. Egy i,j játékos pár, 
ahol ij∈E∖M , blokkolja a (M,p) megoldást, ha i,j létre tud hozni egy új párt – esetleg kilépve 
egy-egy korábbi párból – úgy, hogy mindeketten szigorúan jobban járnak az új megoldásban. 
Egy megoldást stabilnak nevezünk, ha nem létezik blokkoló pár. Egy polinomiális futásidejű 
algoritmust adunk, amely egy stabil megoldást talál, amennyiben létezik ilyen. Hasonló 
eljárás korábban csak a többpartneres hozzárendelési játékokra volt ismert, ahol a gráf páros 
(Sotomayor, 1992), illetve a b≡1 esetre (Biró et al., 2012). Karakterizáljuk továbbá a stabil 
megoldások halmazát kétféle módon is. Végül megvizsgáljuk a kapcsolódó kooperatív TU-
játék magját, amely eltér a stabil megoldások halmazától. 
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Abstract. We generalize two well-known game-theoretic models by intro-
ducing multiple partners matching games, defined by a graph G = (N,E),
with an integer vertex capacity function b and an edge weighting w. The set
N consists of a number of players that are to form a set M ⊆ E of 2-player
coalitions ij with value w(ij), such that each player i is in at most b(i) coali-
tions. A payoff is a mapping p : N × N → R with p(i, j) + p(j, i) = w(ij) if
ij ∈M and p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 if ij /∈M . The pair (M,p) is called a solution.
A pair of players i, j with ij ∈ E \M blocks a solution (M,p) if i, j can form,
possibly only after withdrawing from one of their existing 2-player coalitions,
a new 2-player coalition in which they are mutually better off. A solution is
stable if it has no blocking pairs. We give a polynomial-time algorithm that
either finds that no stable solution exists, or obtains a stable solution. Pre-
viously this result was only known for multiple partners assignment games,
which correspond to the case where G is bipartite (Sotomayor, 1992) and for
the case where b ≡ 1 (Biro´ et al., 2012). We also characterize the set of stable
solutions of a multiple partners matching game in two different ways and
perform a study on the core of the corresponding cooperative game, where
coalitions of any size may be formed. In particular we show that the standard
relation between the existence of a stable solution and the non-emptiness of
the core, which holds in the other models with payments, is no longer valid
for our (most general) model.
Keywords. stable solutions, cooperative game, core.
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1 Introduction
Consider a group of soccer teams participating in a series of friendly games with
each other off-season. Suppose each team has some specific target number of games
it wants to play. For logistic reasons, not every two teams can play against each other.
Each game brings in some revenue, which is to be shared by the two teams involved.
The revenue of a game may depend on several factors, such as the popularity of the
two teams involved or the soccer stadium in which the game is played. In particular,
at the time when the schedule for these games is prepared, the expected gain may
well depend on future outcomes in the current season (which are in general difficult
to predict [21]). In this paper, we assume for simplicity that the revenues are known.
Is it possible to construct a stable fixture of games, that is, a schedule such that there
exist no two unmatched teams that are better off by playing against each other? Note
that if teams decide to play against each other, they may first need to cancel one of
their others games in order not to exceed their targets.
The above example describes the problem introduced in this paper. We model it
as follows. A multiple partners matching game is a triple (G, b, w), where G = (N,E)
is a finite undirected graph on n vertices and m edges with no loops and no multiple
edges, b : N → Z+ is a nonnegative integer function called a vertex capacity function,
and w : E → R+ is a nonnegative edge weighting. The set N is called the player set.
There exists an edge ij ∈ E if and only if players i, j can form a 2-player coalition.
A set M ⊆ E is a b-matching if every player i is incident to at most b(i) edges of
M . So, a b-matching is a set of 2-player coalitions, in which no player is involved
in more 2-player coalitions than described by her capacity. If ij ∈ M then i and j
are matched by M . With M we associate a binary vector xM : E → {0, 1} called
the characteristic function of M , which is defined by xM (ij) = 1 for all ij ∈M and
xM (ij) = 0 for all ij ∈ E \M . Then we can write ∑j:ij∈E xM (ij) ≤ b(i) for all
i ∈ N as an alternative way to state the capacity condition. The value of a 2-player
coalition i, j with ij ∈ E is given by w(ij).
A nonnegative function p : N × N → R+ is a payoff with respect to M if the
following two conditions hold:
• p(i, j) + p(j, i) = w(ij) for all ij ∈M ;
• p(i, j) = p(j, i) = 0 for all ij /∈M .
In that case we also say that M and p are compatible. Note that p prescribes how
the value w(ij) of a 2-player coalition {i, j} is distributed amongst i and j, ensuring
that non-coalitions between two players yield a zero payoff. A pair (M,p), where M
is a b-matching and p is a payoff compatible with M , is a solution for (G, b, w). If
M is a 1-matching (i.e, a matching) then, for each i ∈ N , we have p(i, j) > 0 for at
most one player j 6= i, which must be matched to i. Hence, if b ≡ 1, we assume, with
slight abuse of notation, that p is a nonnegative function defined on N .
Let (M,p) be a solution. Two players i, j with ij ∈ E \M may decide to form
a new 2-player coalition if they are “better off”, even if one or both of them must
first leave an existing 2-player coalition in M (in order not to exceed their individual
capacity). To describe this formally we define a utility function up : N → R+, related
to payoff p. If i is saturated by M , that is, if i is incident with b(i) edges in M , then
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we let up(i) = min{p(i, j) | xM (ij) = 1} be the worst payoff p(i, j) of any 2-player
coalition i is involved in. Otherwise, i is unsaturated by M and we define up(i) = 0.
A pair i, j with ij ∈ E \ M blocks (M,p) if up(i) + up(j) < w(ij). We say that
(M,p) is stable if it has no blocking pairs, or equivalently, if every edge ij ∈ E \M
satisfies the stability condition up(i)+up(j) ≥ w(ij). We can now define our problem
formally:
Stable Fixture with Payments (SFP)
Instance: A multiple partners matching game (G, b, w)
Question: Does (G, b, w) have a stable solution?
So far, we modelled only situations in which 2-player coalitions can be formed.
Allowing coalitions of any size is a natural and well-studied setting in the area of Co-
operative Game Theory. Moreover, as we will discuss, there exist close relationships
between stable solutions and their counterpart in the second setting, the so-called
core allocations, which we define below.
A cooperative game with transferable utilities (TU-game) is a pair (N, v), where
N is a set of n players and a value function v : 2N → R+ with v(∅) = 0. It is
usually assumed that the grand coalition N is formed. Then the central problem is
how to allocate the total value v(N) to the individual players in N . In this context,
a payoff (or allocation) is a vector p ∈ RN with p(N) = v(N), where we write
p(S) =
∑
i∈S p(i) for S ⊆ N . The core of a TU-game consists of all allocations
p ∈ RN satisfying
p(S) ≥ v(S), ∅ 6= S ⊆ N
p(N) = v(N)
(1)
A core allocation is seen as reasonable, because it offers no incentive for a subset
of players to leave the grand coalition and form a coalition on their own. However,
a TU-game may have an empty core. Hence, the most interesting computational
complexity questions (given an input game) are:
1. Is the core non-empty?
2. Can we exhibit a vector in the core – provided there is any?
3. Does a given vector p ∈ RN belong to the core?
In the literature both polynomial-time and (co-)NP-hardness results are known for
each of these three questions (see e.g. [10]). An efficient algorithm for answering
question 3 implies that questions 1-2 can be solved in polynomial time as well. This
follows from the work of Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz and Schrijver [16, 17] who proved, by
refining the ellipsoid method of Khachiyan [22], that an efficient algorithm for solving
the separation problem for a polyhedron P implies a polynomial-time algorithm that
either finds that P is empty, or obtains a vector of P .
We define the TU-game (N, v) that corresponds with a multiple partners match-
ing game (G, b, w) by setting, for every S ⊆ N ,
v(S) = w(MS) =
∑
e∈MS
w(e),
where MS is a maximum weight b-matching in the subgraph of G induced by S
(we define v(S) = 0 if S induces an edgeless graph). We say that (N, v) is defined
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on (G, b, w) but, unless confusion is possible, we may also call (N, v) a multiple
partners matching game. If we say that the payoff vector p of a stable solution is
a core allocation, we mean that the total payoff vector pt ∈ RN defined by pt(i) =∑
ij∈E p(i, j) for all i ∈ N is a core allocation.
Example. LetG be the 4-vertex cycle v1v2v3v4v1. We define a vertex capacity function
b by b(v1) = b(v2) = 1 and b(v3) = b(v4) = 2, and an edge weighting w by w(v1v2) = 3
and w(v2v3) = w(v3v4) = w(v4v1) = 1. The pair (M,p) with M = {v1v2, v3v4} and
p(v1, v2) = p(v2, v1) =
3
2 , p(v3, v4) = p(v4, v3) =
1
2 and p(v2, v3) = p(v3, v2) =
p(v4, v1) = p(v1, v4) = 0 is a solution for the multiple partners matching game
(G, b, w). Note that up(v1) = up(v2) =
3
2 and up(v3) = up(v4) = 0. We find that
(M,p) is even a stable solution, because up(v2) + up(v3) =
3
2 ≥ 1 = w(v2v3) and
up(v4) + up(v1) =
3
2 ≥ 1 = w(v4v1) (note that we only need to verify the stability
condition for edges outside the matching). Moreover, the total payoff vector pt given
by pt(v1) = p
t(v2) =
3
2 and p
t(v3) = p
t(v4) =
1
2 is readily seen to be a core allocation
of the corresponding TU-game. In Section 3 we will give an example of a multiple
partners matching game with no stable solutions for which the corresponding TU-
game has a non-empty core.
Before stating our results for multiple partners matching games in both settings we
first discuss some existing work. As we will see, our model in both settings generalizes
(or relaxes) several well-known models.
1.1 Known Results
The first model that we discuss is related to the famous stable marriage problem
(SM), defined by Gale and Shapley [14] as follows. Given sets I and J of men and
women, respectively, let each player have a strict preference ordering over the oppo-
site set of players. A set of marriages is a matching in the underlying bipartite graph
with partition classes I and J . Such a matching is stable if there is no unmarried
pair, who would prefer to marry each other instead of a possible other partner. Gale
and Shapley [14] proved that every instance of this problem has a stable matching
and gave a linear-time algorithm that finds one. The main assumptions in this model
are
(i) monogamy: each player is matched to at most one other player (1-matching);
(ii) opposite-sex: every match is between players from I and J (bipartiteness);
(iii) no dowry: only cardinal preferences are considered (no payments).
Dropping one or more of these three conditions leads to seven new models, one of
which corresponds to our model of multiple partner matching games, namely the one,
in which none of the three conditions (i)–(iii) is imposed. Below we briefly survey
the other six models (see also Table 1).
In the first three models that we discuss, payments are not allowed. Hence, the
notion of a (core) allocation is meaningless for these three models.
Remove (i). If we allow bigamy, that is, if we allow general b-matchings instead
of only 1-matchings, we obtain the many-to-many stable matching problem, which
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generalizes the stable marriage problem. The problem variant, in which we demand
that b(i) = 1 for each player i ∈ I, is called the college admission problem [14],
which is also known as the many-to-one stable matching problem [31] and as the
hospital/residents problem [27]. Gale and Shapley [14] proved that every instance of
the college admission problem has a stable matching and gave a linear-time algorithm
that finds one. Ba¨ıou and Balinski [1] proved these two results for the (more general)
many-to-many stable matching problem.
Remove (ii). If we allow same-sex marriages, so the underlying graph may be non-
bipartite, then we get the stable roommates problem (SR), also defined by Gale and
Shapley [14]. They proved that, unlike the previously discussed models, in this model
a stable matching does not always exist. Irving [18] gave a linear-time algorithm for
finding a stable matching (if there exists one).
Remove (i) & (ii). Allowing bigamy and same-sex marriages leads to the stable fix-
tures problem (SF), which generalizes the stable roommates problem. Hence, a stable
matching does not always exist. Irving and Scott [19] gave a linear-time algorithm
for finding a stable matching (if there exists one). Cechla´rova´ and Fleiner [7] defined
the more general multiple activities problem, in which the underlying graph may
have multiple edges. They proved that even in this setting a stable matching can be
found in polynomial time (if there exists one). Moreover, they also showed that this
problem can be reduced to SR by a polynomial size graph construction.
In the remaining three models we allow payments to individual players.
Remove (iii). If we allow dowry then we obtain an assignment game, which is a mul-
tiple partners matching game (G, b, w) where G is bipartite and b ≡ 1. In this case
the SFP problem is known as the stable marriage problem with payments (SMP).
Koopmans and Beckmann [25] proved that every instance of SMP has a stable solu-
tion. Shapley and Shubik [33] proved that every core allocation is a payoff vector in
a stable solution and vice versa. Hence, it follows that every assignment game has a
non-empty core. It is possible to obtain a stable solution in polynomial time and also
to give affirmative answers to questions 1-3 about the core of an assignment game; in
the next paragraph we explain that this holds even if we allow same-sex marriages.
Remove (ii) & (iii). If we allow dowry and same-sex marriages then we obtain a
matching game, which is a multiple partners matching game (G, b, w) where b ≡ 1.
In this case the SFP problem is called the stable roommates problem with payments
(SRP). The following two observations are well-known [4, 12] and easy to verify.
First, a payoff p is a core allocation of a matching game if and only if there exists
a matching M , such that (M,p) is a stable solution. Note that the core may be
empty (take a triangle with unit edge weights). Hence, a stable solution may not
always exist.
Second, for matching games, the coalitions in the system of inequalities (1) may
be restricted to 2-player coalitions. This means that question 3, on core member-
ship, can be answered in linear time. As explained, a polynomial-time algorithm for
question 3 also leads to polynomial-time algorithms for solving questions 1-2, about
core non-emptiness, and finding a core allocation, and thus finding a stable solution.
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The restriction to 2-player coalitions even allows one to use the ellipsoid method
of Khachiyan [22] directly. In a previous paper [4], we circumvented the ellipsoid
method and presented an O(nm+n2 log n)-time algorithm that either finds that the
core is empty, or obtains a core allocation.
Remove (i) & (iii). If we allow dowry and bigamy then we obtain a multiple partners
assignment game, which is a multiple partners matching game (G, b, w) where G is
bipartite. In this case the SFP problem is called the multiple partners assignment
problem (MPA). Just as matching games, multiple partners assignment games gener-
alize assignment games. Sotomayor proved the following, which answers questions 1-2
positively (the answer to question 3 was still open for multiple partners assignment
games and is settled in this paper, as we will discuss in Section 1.2).
Theorem 1 ([34]). Every multiple partners assignment game has at least one stable
solution, which can be found in polynomial time. Moreover, for every stable solution
(M,p) it holds that M has maximum weight, p is a core allocation and every other
maximum weight b-matching is compatible with p.
opposite-sex same-sex allowed
(bipartite graphs) (general graphs)
monogamy no dowry SM (stable marriage) SR (stable roommates)
(1-matching) always a stable solution not always a stable solution
dowry SMP / assignment game SRP / matching game
(payments) always a stable solution not always a stable solution
core always non-empty core may be empty
bigamy no dowry many-to-many stable matching SF (stable fixtures)
allowed always a stable solution not always a stable solution
dowry MPA / mp assignment game SFP / mp matching game
always a stable solution not always a stable solution
core always non-empty core may be empty
Table 1. The eight different models; “mp” stands for “multiple partners”, and the high-
lighted case is the new model introduced and considered in this paper. As discussed in
Section 1.1, for all models, the results on the (non-)existence of a stable solution or core
allocation were known already or can be readily deduced from known results. Moreover, as
discussed in Section 1.1 as well, it was already known that for all models, except for the
highlighted model, a stable solution can be found in polynomial time (if it exists) and that
for all the models with payments, except for the highlighted model, a core allocation can
be computed in polynomial time (if the core is non-empty). As explained in Section 1.2,
we give a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a stable solution (if it exists) for the high-
lighted model. We also prove that every stable solution corresponds to a core allocation.
However, in contrast to the correspondence between the existence of stable solutions for
SRP and core allocations for matching games, we show that there exist multiple partners
matching games with a non-empty core, while the corresponding instance of SFP has no
stable solution.
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1.2 Our Results
In Section 2 we will prove that SFP is polynomial-time solvable. This generalizes
the aforementioned corresponding results for SRP and MPA, respectively. Our proof
technique is based on a reduction to MPA. Moreover, we characterize the set of stable
solutions for a given instance of SFP via a reduction to SRP. We do this via linear
programming techniques that show a close relationship between optimal solutions in
the dual LP for SFP and stable solutions in the reduced instance of SRP.
In Section 3 we first prove that also for multiple partners matching games, the
payoff vectors in stable solutions are always core allocations. We then prove that there
exist multiple partners matching games with a non-empty core but for which the
corresponding instance of SFP has no stable solutions. Afterwards we focus on core
membership, which corresponds to question 3. We first show that core membership
is polynomial-time solvable for multiple partner matching games defined on a triple
(G, b, w) with b ≤ 2, that is, with b(i) ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N . Due to the aforementioned
result of Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz and Schrijver [16, 17] this leads to efficient answers to
questions 1–2 as well (for b ≤ 2). In our proof, we make a connection to the tramp
steamer problem [23]. We complement this result by showing that it is tight, namely
that already for b ≡ 3 and w ≡ 1, testing core membership is co-NP-complete even
for multiple partners assignment games (whose core is always non-empty and for
which a core allocation can be found in polynomial time due to Theorem 1).
Finally, in Section 4, we give some directions for future work.
2 Stable Fixtures with Payments
In order to prove our results we will use two known results as lemmas.
Lemma 1 ([3]). If (M,p) is a stable solution of an instance (G, 1, w) of SRP then
M has maximum weight, and every maximum weight matching M ′ of G is compatible
with p.
Lemma 2 ([26]). For a graph G with vertex capacity function b and edge weight-
ing w, it is possible to find a maximum-weight b-matching of G in O(n2m log(n2/m))
time.
2.1 Characterizing Stable Solutions of SFP
In this subsection we show how stable solutions of an instance (G, b, w) of SFP
correspond to both stable solutions of an instance (G′, 1, w′) of SRP, where G′ is a
graph of size O(n3), and to integral optimal solutions of an LP relaxation.
We first explain how to construct (G′, 1, w′); see also Figure 1. Our construction
is based on a well-known construction, which was introduced by Tutte [37] for non-
bipartite graphs with no edge weights. For each player i ∈ N with capacity b(i) we
create b(i) copies, i1, i2, . . . ib(i) in N ′. For each edge ij ∈ E we create four players,
ij , ij , ji, ji, with edges i
sij for s = 1 . . . b(i), ijij , ijji, jiji and jij
t for t = 1 . . . b(j),
each with weight w(ij). This completes the construction. We write G′ = (N ′, E′).
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Fig. 1. The construction of an SPR instance (G′, 1, w′) from a SFP instance (G, b, w).
Note that G′ is bipartite if and only if G is bipartite. Hence, our construction also
reduces an instance of MPA to an instance of SMP.
Given an instance (G, b, w) of SFP, we formulate the corresponding primal LP,
denoted by Primal-(G, b, w), as follows.
max
∑
ij∈E
w(ij)x(ij) (P-obj)
subject to
∑
j:ij∈E
x(ij) ≤ b(i) for each i ∈ N (a)
0 ≤ x(ij) ≤ 1 for each ij ∈ E. (b)
The integral solutions of this LP are the b-matchings of instance (G, b, w). We now
formulate the dual LP, denoted by Dual-(G, b, w).
min
∑
i∈N
b(i)y(i) +
∑
ij∈E
d(ij) (D-obj)
subject to y(i) + y(j) + d(ij) ≥ w(ij) for each ij ∈ E, (a’)
where 0 ≤ y(i) for all i ∈ N, and 0 ≤ d(ij) for all ij ∈ E.
Note that for an optimal dual solution (y, d), it holds that d(ij) = [w(ij)−y(i)−
y(j)]+ (where the latter notation means max{w(ij)− y(i)− y(j), 0}).
We are now ready to prove the following key result.
Theorem 2. Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP. The following statements are
equivalent.
1. (G, b, w) has a stable solution.
2. (G′, 1, w′) has a stable solution.
3. Primal-(G, b, w) has an integral optimal solution.
Proof. We prove in three separate statements that 1 implies 2, 2 implies 3 and 3
implies 1.
1⇒2. Given a stable solution (M,p) of (G, b, w), we define a stable solution (M ′, p′)
of (G′, 1, w′) as follows. Recall that, as b ≡ 1, we define p′ as a function on N ′. The
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payments of the copies will be the same as the minimum payments of the original
players, that is, for each i ∈ N , let p′(is) = up(i) for every s = 1, · · · , b(i). For
each ij ∈ M , if j is i’s s-th partner for some s ∈ {1 . . . b(i)} and i is j’s t-th
partner for some t ∈ {1 . . . b(j)} then let isij ∈ M ′ , ijji ∈ M ′ and jijt ∈ M ′ with
the following payments: p′(ij) = p(i, j) and p′(ij) = w(ij) − up(i), and similarly
p′(ji) = p(j, i) and p′(ji) = w(ij) − up(j). For each ij ∈ E \M , let ijij , jiji ∈ M ′
with p′(ij) = min{up(i), w(ij)} and p′(ij) = w(ij)−min{up(i), w(ij)}, and similarly
p′(ji) = w(ij)−min{up(j), w(ij)} and p′(ji) = min{up(j), w(ij)}. We observe that
(M ′, p′) is a solution for (G′, 1, w′).
In order to prove that (M ′, p′) is a stable solution we have to check the stability
condition for each edge not in M ′. As up′(i) = p′(i) for every i ∈ N ′, this comes down
to checking whether p′(i) + p′(j) ≥ w(ij) for all i, j ∈ N ′. For each edge isij /∈ M ′
there are two cases. In the first case, when p′(ij) = w(ij) − up(i), the condition is
satisfied by equality, because p′(is) = up(i). In the second case, we have p′(ij) =
w(ij) −min{up(i), w(ij)}, so p′(is) + p′(ij) = up(i) + w(ij) −min{up(i), w(ij)} ≥
w(ij). For each edge ijij /∈ M ′, p′(ij) = w(ij) − up(i) and p′(ij) = p(i, j), so
p′(ij) + p′(ij) ≥ w(ij) as up(i) ≤ p(i, j). Finally, if ijji /∈ M ′ then in the first case,
when any payoff of the middle players is w(ij), the requirement is trivially true, and
in the second case when the payoffs of both players differ from w(ij) the stability of
(M,p) implies that p′(ij) + p′(ji) = up(i) + up(j) ≥ w(ij).
2⇒3 Suppose that (M ′, p′) be a stable solution for (G′, 1, w′). We will first prove that
(M ′, p′) can be transformed into a stable solution (M ′′, p′) of (G′, 1, w′), where M ′′ is
a matching that we may obtain by the above reduction from (G, b, w) to (G′, 1, w′).
From Lemma 1 we know that M ′ is a maximum weight matching in (G′, 1, w′). For
a player set X, let E(X) denote the set of edges incident to some player in X. Let
Eij = E({ij , ij , ji, ji}). Considering the edge set Eij , either three or two edges must
be contained in a maximum weight matching M ′. If |Eij ∩M ′| = 3 then M ′ must
contain ijji, i
sij for some s ∈ {1, . . . , b(i)} and jijt for some t ∈ {1, . . . , b(j)}. Let
M ′′ contain the same edges in this case. If |Eij ∩M ′| = 2 then let {ijij , jiji} ⊆M ′′.
Therefore M ′′ is a maximum weight matching, and from Lemma 1, (M ′′, p′) is a
stable solution in (G′, 1, w′), which can be obtained from a reduction from (G, b, w)
to (G′, 1, w′), as described in the first part of our proof.
Now we note that p′(is) = p′(it) for every two indices s, t ∈ {1 . . . b(i)}. This is
because p′(is) < p′(it) would imply that p′(is) > 0, so is must be covered by M ′,
say, isi¯j ∈ M ′, where p′(is) + p′(i¯j) = w(ij), and hence ir i¯j would be blocking, a
contradiction. Therefore we can set y(i) = p′(is) for every copy is of i ∈ N , as this
is well-defined. Together with d(ij) = [w(ij)− y(i)− y(j)]+ for any ij ∈ E we get a
feasible solution (y, d) of Dual-(G, b, w).
Now we define an integral feasible solution x of Primal-(G, b, w) as follows. Let
x(ij) = 1 if ijji ∈M ′′ and x(ij) = 0 otherwise. We prove that (y, d) and x are both
optimal solutions as they satisfy the complementary slackness conditions:
– If
∑
j:ij∈E x(ij) < b(i) then some copy of i ∈ N , say is, is unmatched in M ′′,
therefore y(i) = p′(is) = 0.
– If x(ij) < 1 for some ij ∈ E then ijji /∈ M ′′ and therefore y(i) + y(j) ≥
p′(ij)+p′(ji) ≥ w(ij), where the first inequality is implied by the stability condi-
9
tion for isij /∈M ′′ and jtji /∈M ′′, and the second inequality is implied by the sta-
bility condition for ijji /∈M ′′. As a consequence, d(ij) = [w(ij)−y(i)−y(j)]+ = 0
holds.
– If x(ij) > 0 then ijji ∈ M ′′ and therefore y(i) + y(j) ≤ p′(ij) + p′(ji) = w(ij),
where the inequality is implied by the stability condition for ijij /∈ M ′′ and
jiji /∈M ′′. As a consequence d(ij) = w(ij)− y(i)− y(j) and the dual condition
(a’) is binding.
Hence x is an optimal integral solution for Primal-(G, b, w), as required.
3⇒1 From an optimal solution x of Primal-(G, b, w) and an optimal dual solution
(y, d) of Dual-(G, b, w) we create a stable solution (M,p) for (G, b, w) as follows. Let
M be the b-matching defined by the characteristic function x. For each ij ∈ M we
choose ξ(i, j) ≥ 0 and ξ(j, i) ≥ 0 with ξ(i, j) + ξ(j, i) = d(ij) and define p(i, j) =
y(i) + ξ(i, j). For each ij /∈ M , we define p(i, j) = 0. These are valid payments, as
x(ij) = 1 implies p(i, j)+p(j, i) = y(i)+ξ(i, j)+y(j)+ξ(j, i) = y(i)+y(j)+d(ij) =
w(ij), where the last equality is coming from the fact that condition (a’) is binding.
Now we show that up(i) ≥ y(i) for every i ∈ N . If i is unsaturated by M then
up(i) = y(i) = 0, again by the complementary slackness condition for y(i). If i is
saturated then for every ij ∈ M we have p(i, j) ≥ y(i) by our setting of p(i, j), and
therefore up(i) ≥ y(i) by the definition of up(i). Finally, if ij /∈ M , then x(ij) < 1
implies d(ij) = 0. Consequently, up(i) + up(j) ≥ y(i) + y(j) ≥ w(ij), where the last
equality is due to the fact that (a’) is tight. This completes our proof. uunionsq
Remark 1. From the proof of Theorem 2 we note that there is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between the stable payments in an SFP instance (G, b, w) and the utilities
of some of the players in its reduced SPR instance (G′, 1, w′), namely a pair (M,p)
is a stable solution for (G, b, w) if and only if there exists a stable solution (M ′, p′)
for (G′, 1, w′) with p′(ij) = p(i, j) for every ij ∈M .
Remark 2. Assume (G, b, w) is a solvable instance of SFP. Then there is a one-to-
one correspondence between the dual variables y of an optimal solution (y, d) of
Dual-(G, b, w) and the stable payoffs of the players’ copies in the reduction G′.
Remark 3. In the proof of Theorem 2 we could have used a simpler construction,
namely the one where each 4-player path in the reduced instance, ij , ij , ji, ji is re-
placed with a 2-player path ij , ji. However, this reduction would not give us the
one-to-one correspondence described in Remark 1 and this correspondence is crucial
for the results in the next section.
2.2 Solving SFP efficiently
In order to solve SFP on an instance (G, b, w), we construct the instance (G′, 1, w′)
of SRP. This takes O(n3) time as we may assume without loss of generality that
b(i) ≤ n for all i ∈ N and thus |V (G′)| = ∑i∈N b(i) + 4m = O(n2) and |E(G′)| ≤∑
i∈N b(i)n + 3m ≤ n3 + 3m = O(n3). We then use the aforementioned algorithm
of Biro´ et al. [4] to compute in O(n′m′ + n′2 log n′) = O(n5) time a stable solution
10
for (G′, 1, w′) or else conclude that (G′, 1, w′) has no stable solution. In the first case
we can modify the stable solution into a stable solution of (G, b, w) in O(n3) time,
as described in the proof of Theorem 2. In the second case, Theorem 2 tells us that
(G, b, w) has no stable solution. The total running time is O(n5). Below we present
an algorithm that solves SFP in O(n2m log(n2/m)) time.
A half-b-matching in a graph G = (N,E) with an integer vertex capacity function
b and an edge weighting w is an edge mapping f that maps each edge e to a value
in {0, 12 , 1}, such that
∑
e:v∈e f(e) ≤ b(v) for each v ∈ N . The weight of f is w(f) =∑
e∈E w(e)f(e).
Let (G, b, w) be an instance of SFP. We define its duplicated instance (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ) of
MPA as follows. We replace each player i of G by two players i′ and i′′ in Gˆ with the
same capacities, that is, we set bˆ(i′) = bˆ(i′′) = b(i). Moreover, we replace each edge
ij by two edges i′j′′ and i′′j′ with half-weights, that is, we set wˆ(i′j′′) = wˆ(i′′j′) =
1
2w(ij).
In a previous paper [4], three of us proved the following statement for instances
of SRP only. We now generalize it for instances of SFP by using similar arguments.
Theorem 3. An instance (G, b, w) of SFP admits a stable solution if and only if
the maximum weight of a b-matching in G is equal to the maximum weight of a
half-b-matching in G.
Proof. Suppose that (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ) is the duplicate MPA instance of (G, b, w). From Theo-
rem 1 we know that (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ) admits a stable solution (Mˆ, pˆ), where Mˆ is a maximum
weight b-matching in Gˆ.
Let xˆ be the characteristic function of Mˆ . Let (yˆ, dˆ) denote a dual optimal solu-
tion, which has the same objective function value as xˆ by Theorem 2. We define a
half-b-matching f for (G, b, w) by setting f(ij) = xˆ(i
′j′′)+xˆ(i′′j′)
2 for each ij ∈ E(G).
We observe that
w(f) =
∑
ij∈E(G)
w(ij)f(ij) =
∑
ij∈E(G)
wˆ(i′j′′)xˆ(i′j′′) + wˆ(i′′j′)xˆ(i′′j′) = wˆ(xˆ).
Therefore f is a feasible solution of Primal-(G, b, w) with the same value as xˆ. We
create a feasible dual solution (y, d) for Dual-(G, b, w) from (yˆ, dˆ) with the same
objective function value, namely wˆ(xˆ), as follows. Let y(i) = yˆ(i′) + yˆ(i′′) for every
player i of G and let d(ij) = dˆ(i′j′′)+ dˆ(i′′j′) for every edge ij in E(G). Let us verify
that (y, d) is a feasible dual solution, i.e. that for every edge ij ∈ E(G) we have
y(i) + y(j) + d(ij) = (yˆ(i′) + yˆ(i′′)) + (yˆ(j′) + yˆ(j′′)) + (dˆ(i′j′′) + dˆ(i′′j′))
= (yˆ(i′) + yˆ(j′′) + dˆ(i′j′′)) + (yˆ(i′′) + yˆ(j′) + dˆ(i′′j′))
≥ wˆ(i′j′′) + wˆ(i′′j′)
= w(ij).
Therefore f is a feasible solution for Primal-(G, b, w) and (y, d) is a feasible solution
for Dual-(G, b, w) with the same value, namely wˆ(xˆ), so by the Weak Duality theorem
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both f and (y, d) are optimal solutions. Hence we get that f is indeed a maximum
weight half-b-matching with total weight equal to the primal-dual optimum for both
(G, b, w) and (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ). It is now readily seen that (G, b, w) has a stable solution if
and only if the maximum weight of a b-matching is equal to the maximum weight of
a half-b-matching for (G, b, w). uunionsq
We observe that the maximum weight of a b-matching can be computed in time
O(n2m log(n2/m)), as described in Lemma 2. The maximum weight of a half-b-
matching can be computed in the same time, since the maximum weight of a half-
b-matching in (G, b, w) is the same as the maximum weight of a b-matching in a
duplicated bipartite graph (Gˆ, bˆ, wˆ), as explained in the proof of Theorem 3. This
leads to the following result.
Theorem 4. SFP can be solved in O(n2m log(n2/m)) time.
3 Core Properties
We first show the following result, which is in line with corresponding results for the
other models and thus shows that the notion of stability is well defined with respect
to the core definition.
Proposition 1. The payoff vector of every stable solution of a multiple partners
matching game is a core allocation.
Proof. Consider a multiple partners matching game defined on a triple (G, b, w)
where G = (N,E). Let (M,p) be a stable solution. Recall that pt ∈ RN is the
corresponding total payoff vector defined by pt(i) =
∑
ij∈E p(i, j) for all i ∈ N . Let
S ⊂ N be an arbitrary coalition. Let M ′ be a maximum-weight b-matching in the
subgraph of G induced by S. Then we have that
pt(S) =
∑
i∈S
pt(i)
=
∑
i∈S
( ∑
j:ij∈M∩M ′
p(i, j) +
∑
j:ij∈M\M ′
p(i, j)
)
=
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
(p(i, j) + p(j, i)) +
∑
i∈S
∑
j:ij∈M\M ′
p(i, j)
=
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
w(ij) +
∑
i∈S
∑
j:ij∈M\M ′
p(i, j)
≥
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
w(ij) +
∑
i∈S
∑
j:ij∈M ′\M
up(i)
=
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
w(ij) +
∑
ij∈M ′\M
up(i) + up(j)
≥
∑
ij∈M∩M ′
w(ij) +
∑
ij∈M ′\M
w(ij) = w(M ′) = v(S).
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The first inequality is valid because of the following reason. If i is unsaturated by M
then up(i) = 0 by definition. If i is saturated by M then |j : ij ∈M \M ′| ≥ |j : ij ∈
M ′ \M | and p(i, j) ≥ up(i) holds for every j 6= i by definition. The last inequality
follows from the stability condition for the pairs not matched by M . We conclude
that pt is in the core. uunionsq
In contrast to our results in Section 2, the analysis of the core cannot be reduced
to the the case in which we have unit vertex capacities. The following result illustrates
this.
Proposition 2. There exist multiple partners matching games with a non-empty
core but for which the corresponding instance of SFP has no stable solutions.
Proof. Consider the following example. Take a diamond, that is, a cycle on three
vertices s1, s2, s3 to which we add a fourth vertex u with edges s2u and s3u. We set
b(si) = 2 for i = 1, 2, 3 and b(u) = 1, and w ≡ 1. Then Theorem 3 tells us that
a stable solution does not exist, since the maximum weight of a b-matching is 3,
whilst the maximum weight of a half-b-matching is 3 12 (for the latter, take f(s1s2) =
f(s1s3) = 1 and f(s2s3) = f(s2u) = f(s3u) =
1
2 ). However, the total payoff vector
pt defined by pt(si) = 1 for i = 1, . . . , 3 and p
t(u) = 0, which corresponds to, say, the
b-matching M = {s1s2, s1s3, s2s3} with payments p(s1, s2) = 1, p(s2, s3) = 1 and
p(s3, s1) = 1 and zero payments for the other edges is in the core. uunionsq
Moreover, recall that the core of a multiple partners matching game may be empty,
as we could take, for instance, a triangle on three vertices and set b ≡ 1 and w ≡ 1.
Below we show that this may also be the case for b 6= 1 by presenting the following
example, which shows that the core of a b-matching game may be empty even if
b ≡ 2.
Example. Take a net, that is, a cycle on three vertices s1, s2 and s3 to which we add
a pendant (degree 1) vertex ti to si for i = 1, 2, 3. We set b ≡ 2 and w ≡ 1. Then
v(N) = 4. We may assume without loss of generality that p(ti) = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3.
Then, by symmetry, p(si) =
4
3 for i = 1, 2, 3. Take the coalition S = {s1, s2, t1, t2}.
It holds that p(S) = 2× 43 < 3 = v(S) and thus the core of this game is empty.
In what follows, we first analyze the case b(i) ≤ 2 for i = 1, ..., n. Note that a player i
with b(i) = 0 necessarily gets 0 payoff in any core allocation, so the problem reduces
trivially to G\{i}. For this reason we assume b(i) ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N in the following.
Our first main result is that answering question 3, on testing core membership,
can be done in polynomial time, hereby answering question 3 positively. Recall that
this implies the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm that either finds that the
core is empty, or else obtains a core allocation. As mentioned in Section 1, our algo-
rithm uses an algorithm that solves the tramp steamer problem, which we formally
define below, as a subproblem.
Let G = (N,E) be a graph with an edge weighting p : E → R+ called the
profit function and an edge weighting w : E → R+ called the cost function. Let
C = (NC , EC) be a (simple) cycle of G. The profit-to-cost ratio for a cycle C is
p(C)
w(C)
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where we write p(C) = p(EC) and w(C) = w(EC). The tramp steamer problem
is that of finding a cycle C with maximum profit-to-cost ratio. This problem is
well-known to be polynomial-time solvable both for directed and undirected graphs
(see [23], or [28] for a treatment of more general “fractional optimization” problems).
Lemma 3. The tramp steamer problem can be solved in polynomial time.
We are now ready to prove the first main result of this section.
Theorem 5. The problem of deciding whether an allocation is in the core of a mul-
tiple partners matching game can be solved in polynomial time if b ≤ 2.
Proof. Let (N, v) be a multiple partners matching game defined on a triple (G, b, w),
where b(i) ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N . Given S ⊆ N , a maximum weight b-matching in G[S]
is composed of cycles and paths. Hence the core can be alternatively described by
the following (slightly smaller) set of constraints:
p(C) ≥ w(C), for all cycles C ∈ C
p(P ) ≥ w(P ), for all paths P ∈ P
p(N) = v(N).
(2)
Here, C stands for the set of simple cycles C ⊆ E in G with b(i) = 2 for all i ∈ V (C).
Similarly, P stands for the set of simple paths P with b(i) = 2 for all inner points
on P .
Given p ∈ RN , we can of course easily check whether p(N) = v(N) holds by
computing a maximum weight b-matching in G, which can be done in polynomial
time by Lemma 2. Thus we are left with the inequalities for cycles and paths in (2).
We deal with the cycles first. Let N2 := {i ∈ N | b(i) = 2} and G2 := G[N2]. In
the induced graph G2 = (N2, E2), we “discharge” the given allocations p(i) to the
edges by setting p(i, j) := (p(i) + p(j))/2 for every edge ij in G2. This defines an
edge weighting p : E2 → R such that, obviously, the core constraints for cycles are
equivalent to
max
C∈C
w(C)
p(C)
≤ 1,
where the maximum is taken over all cycles in G2. Hence we obtained an instance
of the tramp steamer problem, which is polynomial-time solvable by Lemma 3. Note
that by solving the above minimization problem we either find that all cycle con-
straints in (2) are satisfied or we end up with a particular cycle C corresponding to
a violated core inequality. (The latter is of particular importance if we intend to use
the “membership oracle” as a subroutine for the ellipsoid method.)
In what follows, we thus assume that all cycle constraints in (2) are satisfied
by the given vector p ∈ RN and turn to the path constraints. We process these
separately for all possible endpoints i0, j0 ∈ N (with i0 6= j0) and all possible lengths
k = 1, ..., n−1. Let Pk(i0, j0) ⊆ P denote the set of (simple) i0−j0-paths of length k in
G. We construct a corresponding auxiliary graph Gk(i0, j0), a subgraph of G×Pk+1,
the product of G with a path of length k. To this end, let N
(1)
2 , ..., N
(k−1)
2 be k − 1
copies of N2. The vertex set of Gk(i0, j0) is then {i0, j0} ∪ N (1)1 ∪ ... ∪ N (k−1)2 . We
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denote the copy of i ∈ N2 in N (r)2 by i(r). The edges of Gk(i0, j0) and their weights
w¯ can then be defined as
(i0, j
(1)) for i0j ∈ E with weight w¯(i0j) := p(i0) + p(j)/2− w(i0j)
(i(r−1), j(r)) for ij ∈ E with weight w¯(ij) := (p(i) + p(j))/2− w(ij)
(i(k−1), j0) for ij0 ∈ E with weight w¯(ij0) := p(i)/2 + p(j0)− w(ij0).
We claim that p(P ) ≥ w(P ) holds for all P ∈ P if and only if the (w.r.t. w¯) shortest
i0 − j0–path in Gk(i0, j0) has weight ≥ 0 for all i0 6= j0 and k = 1, .., n − 1. Then
what is left to do, in order to verify whether p(P ) ≥ w(P ) holds for all P ∈ P, is to
solve O(n3) instances of the shortest path problem, each of which have size O(n2)
by using the well-known Bellman-Ford algorithm [2].
First suppose some P ∈ P has p(P ) < w(P ). Let i0 and j0 denote its endpoints
and let k denote its length. Then P ∈ Pk(i0, j0) corresponds to an i0 − j0-path P¯ in
Gk(i0, j0) of weight w¯(P¯ ) < 0. Now we will show that p(P ) ≥ w(P ) for all P ∈ P
implies w¯(P¯ ) ≥ 0 for all i0 − j0-paths P¯ in any Gk(i0, j0). Indeed, an i0 − j0-path P¯
visiting players i0, i
(1)
1 , ..., i
(k−1)
k−1 , j0 corresponds to a simple i0 − j0 path P ⊆ E in G
plus possibly a number of cycles C1, ..., Cs ⊆ E. Furthermore, by definition of w¯, we
have w¯(P¯ ) = p(P ) − w(P ) +∑i p(Ci) − w(Ci) ≥ p(P ) − w(P ), as we assume that
p(C) ≥ w(C) holds for all cycles. Hence, indeed, w¯(P¯ ) ≥ 0, as claimed. uunionsq
To complement Theorem 5 we will prove that the case b ≡ 3 is co-NP-complete
even for multiple partners assignment games. In order to do this we reduce from the
Cubic Subgraph problem, which is that of testing whether a graph has a 3-regular
subgraph, that is, a subgraph in which every vertex has degree 3. Plesn´ık [30] proved
that Cubic Subgraph is NP-complete even for planar bipartite graphs of maximum
degree 4.
Theorem 6. The problem of deciding whether an allocation is in the core of a mul-
tiple partners assignment game is co-NP-complete if b ≡ 3 and w ≡ 1.
Proof. The problem is readily seen to be in co-NP: given a “certificate” coalition S
we can efficiently verify whether a given allocation p is a core allocation by check-
ing whether v(S) < p(S) holds; the latter can be done in polynomial time due to
Lemma 2. To prove co-NP-hardness we reduce from the Cubic Subgraph problem
restricted to bipartite graphs. Recall that this problem is NP-complete [30].
Let G = (N,E) be a bipartite graph that is an instance of Cubic Subgraph. Let
n = |N |. For each vertex u ∈ V we add a set of five new vertices au, bu, cu, xu, yu,
so in total we add 5n extra vertices to G. We also add every edge between a vertex
in {au, bu, cu} ad a vertex in {u, xu, yu}, so in total we add 9n extra edges to G. We
call the resulting graph G′ = (N ′, E′). Note that each 6-tuple {au, bu, cu, u, xu, yu}
induces a complete bipartite graph K3,3 in G
′ (and that u is a cut vertex of G′
that separates {au, bu, cu, xu, yu} and N \ {u}). Moreover, G′ is a bipartite graph as
desired.
Let (N ′, v) be the multiple partners assignment game defined on (G′, 3, 1), and
let p be the vector, where we set, for every u ∈ U , p(u) = 32 − 1n and p(i) = 32 + 15n
for every i ∈ {au, bu, cu, xu, yu}. Then p is an allocation, as v(N ′) = 9n = p(N ′),
15
where the first equality follows by taking a b-matching that consists of all nine edges
in G[{au, bu, cu, u, xu, yu}] (so, 9n edges in total). We are left to prove that G has a
cubic subgraph if and only if p does not belong to the core of (N ′, v).
First suppose that G has a 3-regular subgraph H = (NH , EH). Then the coalition
NH ⊆ N ′ will not be satisfied: indeed, v(NH) = 32 |NH | > 32 |NH | − 1n |NH | = p(NH),
so p does not belong to the core of (N ′, v).
Now suppose that G has no 3-regular subgraph. For contradiction, assume there
exists a coalition S ⊆ N ′, such that p(S) < v(S). We choose S such that p(S)−v(S)
is minimum, and moreover, we assume that S is a coalition of smallest size over all
such coalitions.
First consider the case that S only contains vertices of N . Then, as G has no
3-regular subgraph, neither does G[S], implying that v(S) ≤ 32 |S| − 1. We use this
inequality to find that p(S) = 32 |S| − 1n |S| ≥ 32 |S| − 1 ≥ v(S), a contradiction with
our assumption that p(S) < v(S). Hence S contains at least one vertex from a set
{au, bu, cu, xu, yu} for some u ∈ N . Let Tu = S ∩ {au, bu, cu, xu, yu}, so we assume
that |Tu| ≥ 1. If |Tu| ≤ 4, then
p(S\Tu)−v(S\Tu) ≤ p(S)−v(S)−|Tu|
(
3
2
+
1
5n
)
+|E(G[Tu∪{u}])| ≤ p(S)−v(S),
contradicting our choice of S. Now suppose that |Tu| = 5. If u /∈ S, then
p(S \ Tu)− v(S \ Tu) ≤ p(S)− v(S)− 5
(
3
2
+
1
5n
)
+ 6 ≤ p(S)− v(S),
contradiction our choice of S again. If u ∈ S, then
p(S \ (Tu ∪ {u}))− v(S \ (Tu ∪ {u})) ≤ p(S)− v(S)− 5
(
3
2
+
1
5n
)
−
(
3
2
− 1
n
)
+ 9
≤ p(S)− v(S),
another contradiction with our choice of S. Hence we conclude that a coalition S
with p(S) < v(S) does not exist. In other words, p belongs to the core of (N ′, v).
This completes the proof of Theorem 6. uunionsq
4 Future Work
We finish our paper with some directions for future research. Our reduction from
SFP to SRP might be used to generalize more known results from SRP to SFP. For
instance, can we generalize the path to stability result of Biro´ et al. [3] for SRP to
be valid for SFP as well?
In contrast to multiple partners assignment games, we do not know the complex-
ity of testing core non-emptiness (question 1) and finding a core allocation (question
2) for multiple partners matching games (G, b, w) when b ≡ 3. We pose these two
questions as open problems. Also it is still a major open problem to determine the
complexity of computing the so-called nucleolus of a matching game (N, v), and so
far only partial results have been obtained in this direction, namely polynomial-time
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algorithms for unit edge weights [20] or, more generally, for edge weights that can
be expressed as the sum of positive weights on the incident vertices of the graph
G = (N,E) [29], or even more generally, for arbitrary edge weights as long as a
certain condition on the least core of a subgraph (with vertex weights) of G is sat-
isfied [13]. Can these results be generalized for b ≤ 2? Recently, Bousquet [6] proved
that the Shapley value of a matching game can be computed in polynomial time for
trees. Hence, another research direction would be to consider the Shapley value for
multiple partners matching games restricted to trees.
Chalkiadakis et al. [8] defined cooperative games with overlapping coalitions,
where players can be involved in coalitions with different intensities, leading to three
alternative core definitions. It would be interesting to study the problem of finding a
stable solutions and questions 1–3 in these settings. To illustrate this, suppose that
the set of soccer teams from the example in Section 1 consists of international teams.
Then it seems realistic that the home team needs to spend fewer days for playing the
game than the visiting team, which must travel from another country. Hence, every
team now has a number of days for playing friendly games instead of an upper limit
(target) on the number of such games. As another example of two-player coalitions
that require different intensities, consider a PhD student, who can be expected to
spend significantly more time per week on her PhD project per than her supervisor.
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